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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 The State of Montana (“Montana”) and Her Majesty 
Queen Elizabeth II in Right of Canada (“the Crown”)1 appeal 
the June 11, 2012 order
2
 of the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s 
confirmation of the plan of reorganization of W.R. Grace & 
Co, et al. (“Grace”).3  We conclude that the District Court 
                                              
 
1
 Although other courts of appeals have referred to the 
Queen by the territory over which she is sovereign, see, e.g., 
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario v. EPA, 912 F.2d 
1525, 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (referring to “Her Majesty the 
Queen in Right of Ontario” as “Ontario”), for consistency’s 
sake we adopt the term used by her counsel and the District 
Court, and further adopt the District Court’s convention of 
referring to the sovereign as “it.” 
 
2
  The District Court first issued an order affirming the 
Bankruptcy Court’s confirmation decision on January 30, 
2012.  See In re W.R. Grace & Co., 468 B.R. 81 (D. Del. 
2012).  At the request of the parties, the Court subsequently 
addressed an additional issue not relevant to this appeal and, 
on June 11, 2012, it issued an amended and superseding 
opinion and order.  See In re W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. 34 
(D. Del. 2012).  Montana and the Crown appealed both 
orders, but the earlier order has since been withdrawn.      
 
3
  For simplicity, we refer to the appellee-debtors 
collectively and in the singular as “Grace,” as the District 
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correctly denied Montana’s and the Crown’s objections to 
plan confirmation, and we will accordingly affirm.   
 
I. Background 
 
 A. The Grace Bankruptcy 
 
 This appeal arises from Grace’s ongoing efforts to 
reorganize under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 
U.S.C. § 1101, et seq., in a manner that resolves all of its 
present and future asbestos liabilities.  The company, which 
has manufactured and sold specialty chemicals and 
construction materials for more than a century, began facing 
asbestos-related lawsuits in the 1970s.  Those lawsuits were 
based on alleged harm caused by a number of Grace’s 
products and activities, including its operation of a 
vermiculite mine in Libby, Montana.  Grace operated the 
mine from 1963 to 1990, and during that period the mining 
process released asbestos-containing dust into the atmosphere 
and allegedly sickened hundreds of area residents.  Grace also 
had to confront many property damage lawsuits, including 
claims seeking recovery for the removal of asbestos-
containing products from homes and businesses.   
 
 As a result of Grace’s production of asbestos-
containing materials, Montana and the Crown have been 
subject to asbestos-related lawsuits due to their alleged failure 
to warn their citizens of the risks posed by Grace’s products 
                                                                                                     
Court did.  See In re W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. at 63 n.3.  
Grace actually consists of 62 separate entities.  See In re W.R. 
Grace & Co., 446 B.R. 96, 102 n.2 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) 
(listing those entities). 
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and activities.  Montana was named as a defendant in 
approximately 210 cases in Montana state courts, based on 
allegations that Montana officials failed to warn people in the 
vicinity of the vermiculite mine that they were at risk of 
asbestos exposure.  Some of the cases also involved claims 
that Montana aided and abetted Grace’s allegedly unlawful 
activities.  In 2004, the Montana Supreme Court held that the 
state had a duty to warn residents of “workplace conditions 
known to be hazardous to health,” but the court did not 
resolve whether Montana had breached that duty.  Orr v. 
State, 106 P.3d 100, 110, 118 (Mont. 2004).  The state settled 
all of those cases for $43 million in 2011.  As for the Crown, 
it has been named as a defendant in several failure-to-warn 
class action lawsuits involving property damage and personal 
injury claims arising from the use of “Zonolite Attic 
Insulation” (“ZAI”), a Grace insulation product that contains 
trace amounts of asbestos.  The Crown further asserts that 
there may be future asbestos claims against it.  Because of 
their exposure to asbestos liability, Montana and the Crown 
contend that they are entitled to contribution and 
indemnification from Grace.
4
      
 
 By 2001, the number of asbestos-related lawsuits 
against Grace had grown to 65,000, which threatened the 
company’s financial viability and prompted it to file for 
Chapter 11 protection.  Grace hoped that it could use § 524(g) 
of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 524(g), to establish a 
means for resolving the thousands of present and future 
                                              
 
4
  The Crown also claims to have direct property 
damage claims against Grace due to “costs incurred to seal 
attics and otherwise remediate ZAI installed in homes on 
military bases in Canada.”  (Crown Opening Br. at 14.)   
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asbestos-related claims against the company.  That provision, 
discussed in depth herein, allows a company like Grace to set 
up a trust that will assume its asbestos liabilities.  The statute 
likewise authorizes an injunction to channel all asbestos-
related claims to such a trust.  See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(A), 
(2)(B).  Section 524(g) thus allows companies to emerge from 
bankruptcy free of asbestos liability, but only if the particular 
channeling injunction in the case satisfies certain 
prerequisites, including that it be “fair and equitable” to 
future claimants.  See id. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii).   
 
 It took Grace and its creditors’ committees seven years 
of contentious negotiations and litigation to reach an 
agreement regarding the basic structure of the company’s 
reorganization.  The litigation included a protracted dispute 
over estate assets, which focused on Grace’s transfer of 
billions of dollars to two former affiliates, as well as 
numerous disagreements with Grace’s insurance providers.  
Those disputes eventually settled, resulting in the allocation 
of more than 1.5 billion dollars to a proposed § 524(g) trust.     
 
 Grace also worked to resolve disputes with the nearly 
130,000 claimants who brought pre-petition asbestos personal 
injury and property damage claims.  The company 
successfully settled with the vast majority of claimants 
bringing what came to be called “traditional” property 
damage claims – i.e., claims that do not involve ZAI – and it 
reached global agreements addressing the resolution of 
present and future ZAI property damage claims.  With regard 
to the personal injury claims, Grace and the claimants 
engaged in extended negotiations over the estimated value of 
Grace’s personal injury liabilities and the corresponding 
amount needed to adequately fund a § 524(g) trust.  In April 
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2008, the Bankruptcy Court held an “estimation trial” to 
resolve those questions.  At that trial, representatives for the 
personal injury claimants, which included the personal injury 
creditors’ committee (the “PI Committee”) and a court-
appointed future claimants’ representative, presented expert 
testimony that estimated Grace’s liability to be somewhere 
between 6.3 and 7.4 billion dollars.  Grace’s experts, on the 
other hand, put the company’s liability at 468 million dollars.  
Given that disparity, the parties opted for settlement and 
agreed to a term sheet that created the essential structure of a 
joint plan.   
 
 B. The Joint Plan 
 
 Soon after that settlement in April 2008, Grace, the PI 
Committee, the future claimants’ representative, and the 
equity committee proposed a Joint Plan of Reorganization 
(the “Plan” or the “Joint Plan”),5 the central pillars of which 
are two trusts – a personal injury trust and a property damage 
trust – that will assume all of Grace’s current and future 
asbestos liabilities.  The Joint Plan also provides for a 
§ 524(g) channeling injunction, which will send all asbestos-
related claims against Grace (and certain protected third 
parties), including future claims, to the trusts, allowing the 
protected parties to be “unconditionally, irrevocably and fully 
released” from “any and all Asbestos-Related Claims.”  (J.A. 
at 200117.)  As its name suggests, the personal injury trust 
will assume all of Grace’s direct and indirect asbestos 
                                              
 
5
  The Joint Plan was initially filed on September 19, 
2008, and a “finalized” version was filed on February 27, 
2009.  The Plan continued to undergo modifications, 
however, through December 23, 2010.   
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personal injury liabilities.
6
  It is funded by the 1.5 billion 
dollars obtained through settlements with Grace’s insurers 
and former affiliates, by an initial payment from Grace of 450 
million dollars, by a warrant to acquire 10 million shares of 
Grace common stock at 17 dollars a share, and by deferred 
cash payments from Grace of 100 to 110 million dollars per 
year through 2033.
7
  In total, those funding sources will 
provide more than 3 billion dollars to the trust.  The property 
damage trust will likewise assume all of the protected parties’ 
direct and indirect property damage liabilities, including ZAI 
property damage claims, and it is funded by an initial 
payment of 180 million dollars, and a subsequent payment of 
                                              
 
6
  Specifically, the personal injury trust will “assume 
the liabilities of the Debtors with respect to all Asbestos 
[Personal Injury] Claims,” and will “process, liquidate, pay 
and satisfy all Asbestos [Personal Injury] Claims in 
accordance … with [the] Plan.”  (J.A. at 200092.)  The Plan’s 
definition of an Asbestos Personal Injury Claim includes any 
claim against Grace that, “directly or indirectly,” is “based 
on, arising out of, resulting from, or attributable to … death, 
wrongful death, personal or bodily injury …, sickness, 
disease, loss of consortium, survivorship, medical monitoring, 
or other personal injuries,” and “the presence of or exposure 
at any time to” Grace’s asbestos products or production.  (J.A. 
at 200041.)  It therefore includes personal injury claims 
arising from ZAI.     
 
7
  The deferred payments to the trust are secured by a 
majority of Grace’s common stock.   
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30 million dollars.
8
  Some of that money will then be 
transferred to a special fund that will be used to compensate 
Canadian ZAI property damage claimants.       
 
 In addition to being separately funded, the two trusts 
proposed by the Joint Plan have separate mechanisms for 
resolving claims.  Claims brought against the personal injury 
trust are to be resolved in accordance with the personal injury 
trust agreement and the “trust distribution procedures,” or 
“TDPs.”  The TDPs establish two primary methods by which 
claims will be assessed, valued, and paid.  Under an 
“expedited review” process, claims will be categorized and 
assigned a set amount of recovery according to a schedule of 
eight asbestos-related disease levels, some of which require 
demonstration of certain medical or exposure criteria.  
Claimants who do not meet those criteria, or who “seek to 
establish a liquidated value for the claim that is greater than 
its Scheduled Value,” will also have the option of utilizing an 
individual review process, which could involve arbitration or 
litigation of their claims.  (J.A. at 200293.)  Both the 
expedited review and the individual review will result in a 
determination of the liquidated value of a claim.  Claimants 
will not be paid the full liquidated value, however.  Rather, 
each claimant will recover a certain percentage of the 
liquidated value of his or her claim – a “Payment Percentage” 
– in order to ensure that there is money left for future 
claimants to receive comparable recoveries.  The TDPs set 
the initial Payment Percentage at between 25% and 35%, 
meaning that personal injury claimants should receive 
                                              
 
8
   Subject to certain conditions, reorganized Grace is 
also obliged to make additional future payments to the trust if 
needed to satisfy future demands.   
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somewhere between 25% and 35% of the liquidated value of 
their claims.  That percentage may “be adjusted upwards or 
downwards from time to time … to reflect then-current 
estimates of the [personal injury] [t]rust’s assets and its 
liabilities, as well as [the] then-estimated value of then-
pending and future claims.” (J.A. at 200296.)  All claims are 
also limited to a “maximum value” based on the relevant 
disease level, unless the claim qualifies as an “extraordinary 
claim,”9 in which case it is capped at the “maximum 
extraordinary value” for such claims.  Claims will be paid on 
a “first-in, first-out” basis, which means that a claimant can 
recover from the trust as soon as the value of the claim is 
established.  The trust will be administered by designated 
trustees, in consultation with a Trust Advisory Committee and 
the future claimants’ representative.   
 
 The property damage trust resolves claims somewhat 
differently.  Under the agreement governing that trust, all 
allowable “traditional” property damage claims will be paid 
in full, and there is no expedited process for determining the 
value of a claim.  ZAI property damage claims brought by 
United States residents will also be paid from the property 
damage trust, but they will be resolved in accordance with 
procedures that closely resemble the personal injury TDPs.  
                                              
 
9
  An “extraordinary claim” is a claim held by someone 
“whose exposure to asbestos … occurred predominately as a 
result of working in a manufacturing facility of Grace … or 
… was at least 75% the result of exposure to asbestos or an 
asbestos-containing product or to conduct for which Grace 
has legal responsibility, and in either case there is little 
likelihood of a substantial recovery elsewhere.”  (J.A. at 
200323.)  
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Canadian ZAI property damage claimants will be paid 
pursuant to a settlement agreement reached by representatives 
of those claimants and Grace.   
 
 In addition to establishing the two § 524(g) trusts, the 
Joint Plan divides claimants into eleven classes, one of which 
is further divided into two subclasses.
10
  Relevant here, Class 
6 includes all asbestos personal injury claims (including 
Canadian and U.S. ZAI personal injury claims), Class 7A 
includes traditional asbestos property damage claims, Class 
7B includes U.S. ZAI property damage claims, and Class 8 
includes Canadian ZAI property damage claims.
11
  Like the 
                                              
 
10
  Both Montana and the Crown filed proofs of claim 
against Grace during its bankruptcy case.   
 
11
  The full list of classes provided for in the Joint Plan 
is as follows: 
Class 1: Priority Claims 
Class 2: Secured Claims 
Class 3: Employee Benefit Claims 
Class 4: Workers’ Compensation 
Claims 
Class 5: Intercompany Claims 
Class 6: Asbestos Personal Injury 
Claims 
Class 7A: Asbestos Property 
Damage Claims, excluding United 
States ZAI Claims 
Class 7B: United States ZAI 
Claims 
Class 8: Canadian ZAI Claims 
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trusts, those classes do not distinguish between direct and 
indirect claims, and so Montana’s claims for indemnification 
and contribution are classified in Class 6 alongside claims 
brought directly by people allegedly harmed by Grace’s 
activities.  The Crown’s claims fall into two different classes; 
any claims arising from personal injury ZAI suits are grouped 
in Class 6, whereas all direct and indirect ZAI property 
damage claims are in Class 8.  Both of those classes are 
considered to be “impaired classes,” as is Class 7B, because 
claimants in those classes will not be able to recover the full 
value of their liquidated claims.  All of the claims in Classes 
6, 7, and 8 are subject to the channeling injunction provided 
for in the Joint Plan.   
 
 C. Procedural History 
 
 Following the submission of the Joint Plan, the 
bankruptcy trustees solicited votes from members of the 
impaired classes and the classes whose claims would be 
channeled to the trusts.  Each of the classes of channeled 
claims easily cleared the hurdle of a 75 percent vote in favor 
of the Plan, as is required by § 524(g), see 11 U.S.C. 
§ 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb) (providing that a class of claimants 
“whose claims are to be addressed by a trust” must “vote[], 
by at least 75 percent of those voting, in favor of the plan”), 
                                                                                                     
Class 9: General Unsecured 
Claims 
Class 10: Equity Interests in the 
Parent 
Class 11: Equity Interests in 
Debtors Other Than the Parent 
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and the only other class that the Joint Plan considers to be 
“impaired” (Class 11 – the equity holders) also voted for the 
Plan.
12
  The Bankruptcy Court then held a sixteen-day 
confirmation hearing, which began on September 8, 2009.  
During that hearing, numerous parties, including Montana 
and the Crown, objected to confirmation of the Joint Plan on 
the basis that it did not comply with the requirements of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  In particular, Montana and the Crown 
argued that their claims could not properly be considered in 
Class 6, that they were improperly subject to the channeling 
injunction, and that they were treated unfairly under the Plan.        
 
 After the Bankruptcy Court heard testimony and 
argument from both the Plan proponents and the objectors, 
the Plan was amended to address many of the objections.  The 
Court then entered a confirmation order on January 31, 2011, 
and overruled the remaining objections, including the 
objections of Montana and the Crown.  In re W.R. Grace & 
Co., 446 B.R. 96, 102-03 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).
13
  On appeal, 
the District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s order, 
                                              
 
12
  Another class of creditors – bank lenders in the 
“general unsecured creditors” class – also claim to be 
impaired, and did not vote in favor of the Joint Plan.  Their 
objections to the Plan are the subject of a different appeal.    
 
13
  On February 15, 2011, the Bankruptcy Court issued 
an order clarifying the January 31, 2011 order and 
memorandum opinion, which made “clear that the Joint Plan 
as modified is confirmed” and requested “that the District 
Court issue and affirm the Confirmation Order … including, 
without limitation, the injunction pursuant to § 524(g)(3).”  
(J.A. at 100081.)    
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accepting as “reasonable” the inclusion of Montana’s and the 
Crown’s claims in classes with direct asbestos claims, In re 
W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. 34, 110 (D. Del. 2012), and 
concluding that their claims “are properly enjoined and 
channeled to the trust,” id. at 111, and that “the record is 
devoid of any evidence indicating disparate treatment” of 
their claims, id. at 136.  The Court therefore held that the 
Bankruptcy Court had properly overruled Montana’s and the 
Crown’s objections to plan confirmation.  This timely appeal 
followed.         
 
II. Discussion
14
 
 
 Montana and the Crown both argue on appeal that the 
Bankruptcy Court and the District Court erred in confirming 
                                              
 
14
  The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a) and 1334(b).  The District Court had 
appellate jurisdiction over the Bankruptcy Court’s decision 
under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).  We have jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291.  We 
exercise “plenary review of an order from a district court 
sitting as an appellate court in review of a bankruptcy court.”  
In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 961-62 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Under that standard, “[w]e review the District Court’s 
conclusions of law de novo, its factual findings for clear 
error, and its exercise of discretion for abuse thereof.”  In re 
Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 214 n.19 (3d Cir. 
2004).  Under the clearly erroneous standard, we must uphold 
the Bankruptcy Court’s factual findings unless we are “left 
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.”  In re CellNet Data Sys., Inc., 327 F.3d 242, 244 
(3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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Grace’s Joint Plan of Reorganization because the Plan fails to 
comply with the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1) (“The court shall confirm a 
plan only if … [t]he plan complies with the applicable 
provisions of this title.”).  Although they raise many specific 
objections, which we discuss infra, Montana and the Crown 
have three fundamental complaints about the Plan: (1) it 
wrongly channels their claims to the § 524(g) trusts; (2) it 
discriminates against their claims for indemnification and 
contribution;
15
 and (3) it is not “fair and equitable” to future 
claimants.  We address each of those contentions in turn, and 
conclude that each was rightly rejected.     
 
 A. The Channeling Injunction 
 
 Montana and the Crown attempt to escape the scope of 
the channeling injunction by invoking two different 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.  First, they say that § 
524(g) does not encompass their claims against Grace.  They 
argue that they lack “claims” or “demands” as those terms are 
used in § 524(g), and that that provision does not permit the 
channeling of the particular kind of claims they do have, 
namely claims for indemnification or contribution.  Second, 
they contend that § 1122 should prevent their claims from 
being placed in the same class as direct personal injury 
claims.  Both arguments do not persuade us, as § 524(g) 
broadly encompasses all asbestos-related actions against the 
                                              
 
15
  The Crown raises two independent arguments in 
this regard, contending that the Plan grants preferential 
treatment to U.S. claims and impermissibly prevents indirect 
claimants from qualifying for “extraordinary claim” status.  
We address those claims in Section II.B, infra. 
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debtor, including claims for indemnification and contribution, 
and because such claims are sufficiently similar to direct 
personal injury claims that they can be classified together 
under § 1122.      
 
  1. Section 524(g) 
 
 As we have explained on previous occasions, § 524(g) 
“provides a special form of supplemental injunctive relief for 
an insolvent debtor facing the unique problems and 
complexities associated with asbestos liability.”  In re 
Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d 190, 234 (3d Cir. 2004); see 
also In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., 684 F.3d 355, 362 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (describing § 524(g) as a “quasi-administrative 
process” for resolving a company’s asbestos liabilities).  
Modeled after the “creative solution” to asbestos liability 
developed during the bankruptcy of the Johns-Manville 
Corporation, Federal-Mogul, 684 F.3d at 359 (internal 
quotation marks omitted), § 524(g) permits all asbestos-
related claims against the debtor to be channeled to a trust, 
and thus it “relieves the debtor of the uncertainty of future 
asbestos liabilities,” Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 234.  See 
also H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 40 (1994) (explaining that 
§ 524(g) “is modeled on the trust-injunction in the Johns-
Manville case”).16  By removing that uncertainty and 
                                              
 
16
  The Johns-Manville Corporation was formerly the 
world’s largest miner of asbestos, and it filed for bankruptcy 
in 1982.  Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp, 843 F.2d 636, 639 
(2d Cir. 1988).  Its plan of reorganization pioneered the use of 
a trust and a channeling injunction to equitably resolve the 
company’s asbestos liabilities.  Id. at 690; see also In re 
Federal-Mogul Global Inc., 684 F.3d 355, 359 (3d Cir. 2012) 
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allowing the debtor to emerge from bankruptcy free of all 
asbestos liability, § 524(g) facilitates the company’s ongoing 
viability, which in turn provides the trust “with an ‘evergreen’ 
source of funding to pay future claims.”  Combustion Eng’g, 
391 F.3d at 234.  In order to qualify for that relief, however, a 
debtor must satisfy certain prerequisites designed to ensure 
that future asbestos claimants will be treated fairly.  Federal-
Mogul, 684 F.3d at 359 n.9; see also 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2).  
The statute thus furthers two goals: ensuring the equitable 
resolution of present and future asbestos claims, and 
“enabling corporations saddled with asbestos liability to 
obtain the ‘fresh start’ promised by bankruptcy.”  Federal-
Mogul, 684 F.3d at 359.   
 
 At issue in this case is the proper scope of a § 524(g) 
channeling injunction.  Montana and the Crown argue that, 
under § 524(g), their legal efforts to obtain indemnification 
and contribution cannot be channeled to a trust.  They say the 
statute “only enjoins ‘claims’ or ‘demands,’” and that their 
particular claims – what they like to call “requests” – do not 
fall within the definition of either term.  (Montana Opening 
                                                                                                     
(“The primary bankruptcy innovation for addressing mass tort 
liability has been the post-confirmation trust, which first 
appeared in the bankruptcy proceedings of the Johns-
Manville Corporation … .”).  The Johns-Manville plan 
significantly underestimated the number of claims that would 
be filed, however, and the trust rapidly became insolvent.  In 
re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 78 F.3d 764, 769 (2d 
Cir. 1996).  As a result, subsequent litigation produced a 
settlement agreement that imposed new trust distribution 
procedures intended to preserve value for future claimants.  
Id. at 770-71.   
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Br. at 26.)  They further indicate that, even if they do hold 
“claims” or “demands” within the meaning of § 524(g), those 
claims are not the sort that can be channeled to a trust.  They 
assert that § 524(g) permits a channeling injunction to extend 
only to personal injury, wrongful death, and property damage 
actions, not to their claims for indemnification and 
contribution, which are “of a different nature” because they 
arise from Montana’s and the Crown’s alleged failures to 
warn their citizens of the dangers of Grace’s activities.17  
(Montana Opening Br. at 25.)  Grace responds that both 
arguments misunderstand the text, history, and purpose of 
§ 524(g), which is designed to permit all asbestos-related 
actions against the debtor – both direct and indirect – to be 
channeled to a trust, including actions for contribution and 
indemnification. 
 
 To determine whether the scope of § 524(g) 
encompasses “requests” like those that Montana and the 
Crown plan to make, we look first to the text of that 
provision.  Section 524(g) allows a court “to enjoin entities 
from taking legal action for the purpose of directly or 
indirectly collecting, recovering, or receiving payment or 
recovery with respect to any claim or demand that, under a 
plan of reorganization, is to be paid in whole or in part by a 
trust described in [§ 524(g)(2)(B)(i)] … .”  11 U.S.C. 
§ 524(g)(1)(B).  Put more simply, “any claim or demand” that 
                                              
 
17
  In their briefing, Montana and the Crown make 
those arguments in reverse order.  We address them in the 
order here because it seems more logical to consider whether 
Montana and the Crown have claims at all before determining 
if the substance of those claims is proper.    
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will be paid by a § 524(g) trust cannot, because of the 
§ 524(g) injunction, be brought against the debtor.        
 
 That brings us to the question of what constitutes a 
“claim or demand.”  The Bankruptcy Code defines a “claim” 
using the “broadest available definition,” FCC v. NextWave 
Pers. Commc’ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 302 (2003) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), which provides that a “claim” is a 
“right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to 
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, 
matured, unmatured, disputed, legal, equitable, secured, or 
unsecured,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A).  Section 524(g) takes that 
definition and expands it even further, including within the 
sweep of the channeling injunction not only “claims” but also 
“demands.”  Id. § 524(g)(1)(B).   A “demand” is then defined 
as a “demand for payment, present or future” that “was not a 
claim during the proceedings leading to the confirmation of a 
plan of reorganization” but “arises out of the same or similar 
conduct or events that gave rise to the claims addressed by the 
injunction.”  Id. § 524(g)(5).  A § 524(g) channeling 
injunction can therefore include any right to or demand for 
payment that arises from the debtor’s underlying asbestos 
liabilities, regardless of when that right or demand arises, 
whether it was raised during the bankruptcy proceeding or is 
contingent on a future event. 
 
 Despite the breadth of those definitions, Montana and 
the Crown contend that their particular “requests” for 
contribution and indemnification somehow fall outside of the 
channeling injunction’s scope.  They say that their “requests” 
cannot be considered “claims” because claims for 
contribution and indemnification do not technically arise until 
a judgment or settlement has been paid, and at the time of 
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Grace’s bankruptcy petition no such judgments had been 
entered against either Montana or the Crown.  Their 
“requests” are also not “demands,” they explain, because 
those requests are not personal injury, wrongful death, or 
property damage claims, and thus they did not “aris[e] out of 
the same or similar conduct” as the claims subject to the 
injunction.  See id. § 524(g)(5)(B).   
 
 While those arguments reflect some creativity, they are 
ultimately unpersuasive.  Montana’s and the Crown’s 
assertion that a “claim” arises when it fully accrues is based 
on the now-rejected reasoning of Avellino & Bienes v. M. 
Frenville Co. (In re Frenville), 744 F.2d 332, 335-36 (3d Cir. 
1984), which we explicitly overruled in In re Grossman’s, 
Inc., 607 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc).  See Grossman’s, 
607 F.3d at 121 (holding that the “accrual test” previously 
established in Frenville “should be and now is overruled”).18  
The law in this Circuit now is that “a claim arises when an 
                                              
 
18
 In re Frenville held that “a ‘claim,’ as that term is 
defined by the Bankruptcy Code, arises when the underlying 
state law cause of action accrues.”  Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 
118 (citing In re Frenville, 744 F.2d at 337).  That approach 
to determining when a claim arises was uniformly criticized 
as incompatible with the broad definition of “claim” in the 
Bankruptcy Code, id. at 120, and in Grossman’s we rejected 
it in favor of the rule that “a ‘claim’ arises when an individual 
is exposed pre-petition to a product or other conduct giving 
rise to an injury, which underlies a ‘right to payment’ under 
the Bankruptcy Code,” id. at 125.  Two years later, in Wright 
v. Owens Corning, we expanded that holding to include 
conduct that occurs post-petition but pre-confirmation.  679 
F.3d 101, 106-07 (3d Cir. 2012).      
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individual is exposed pre-confirmation to a product or other 
conduct giving rise to an injury that underlies a ‘right to 
payment’ under the Code.”  Wright v. Owens Corning, 679 
F.3d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 2012) (emphasis omitted).   A “claim” 
can therefore exist “before a right to payment exists under 
state law.”  Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 121.  Regardless of 
when Montana and the Crown may have had judgments 
entered against them,
19
 the material fact is that Grace’s 
asbestos-related activities underlie any rights to 
indemnification and contribution that they can assert.  Grace’s 
relevant activities all occurred long before its bankruptcy 
filing, and thus, to the extent that Montana and the Crown 
have “claims,” those claims arose before confirmation of the 
Joint Plan. 
 
 For largely the same reason, Montana’s and the 
Crown’s argument regarding “demands” also fails.  Although 
they claim that requests for contribution and indemnification 
do not “aris[e] from” the same conduct as personal injury or 
property damage claims, that argument ignores the underlying 
basis for such requests: Grace’s alleged asbestos liability.  
Any action that Montana and the Crown say they have against 
Grace arises from the same events as do all the other claims 
and demands covered by the channeling injunction, namely 
Grace’s production of asbestos-containing materials.  
Therefore, if Montana and the Crown have requests for 
                                              
 
19
 Montana says that, “with the exception of one 
complaint, [it] was not named as a defendant in any … State 
Court Actions until after the Petition Date.”  (Montana 
Opening Br. at 10.)  It appears, however, to have settled all of 
the state court claims against it prior to confirmation of the 
Joint Plan.     
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payment that were not “claims” during the bankruptcy 
proceeding, those requests would meet the definition of 
“demand” in § 524(g).  See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(5).     
 
 More fundamentally, the arguments made by Montana 
and the Crown are based on a misunderstanding of the 
purpose of § 524(g).  By arguing that they have “requests” for 
payment from Grace that cannot be called “claims” or 
“demands,” Montana and the Crown suggest that those terms 
constitute discreet categories, and that some asbestos-related 
actions fall into neither category and thus cannot be subject to 
§ 524(g).  The text and history of § 524(g) tell us just the 
opposite.  As for the text, § 524(g)’s definition of “demand” 
overlaps to some degree with the Bankruptcy Code’s 
definition of “claim” – a “demand” could be a request for 
payment that was not raised during the bankruptcy 
proceeding, which also fits the Code’s definition of a “claim.”  
Furthermore, by taking the already broad definition of 
“claim” and expanding it to include all other “demands for 
payment” that arise from the same conduct, § 524(g) evinces 
an intent to include all potential asbestos-related liability of a 
debtor, regardless of when such liability arose.  See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 524(g)(1)(B), (5).   
 
 That intent is also reflected in the history and purpose 
of the provision.  Congress enacted § 524(g) in part because 
of the long latency period of many asbestos-related diseases, 
which, in cases like this, typically creates a large pool of 
future claimants whose disease has not yet manifested.  See 
H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 40 (1994) (noting that “[a]sbestos-
related disease has a long latency period” of “up to 30 years 
or more”).  Congress was concerned about those claimants for 
two reasons – they lack the ability to protect their own 
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interests during the bankruptcy proceeding, and they create 
tremendous uncertainty for companies in Grace’s position, 
which can hinder a company’s financial rebound and limit 
available recovery for all asbestos victims.  See id. 
(explaining that future claimants “do not have their own 
voice” and that “lingering uncertainty” can “undermine[] the 
‘fresh start’ objectives of bankruptcy and the goals of the trust 
arrangement”); see also In re Flintkote Co., 486 B.R. 99, 124 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (“In part because of long latency 
periods of certain asbestos-related illnesses, Congress enacted 
§ 524(g) to protect the due process rights of the exposed yet 
unimpaired.”).   
 
 Section 524(g) addresses those concerns by imposing 
requirements to protect the rights of future claimants, and 
then, if those requirements are met, channeling all present and 
future asbestos-related liability to a trust funded by the 
debtor.  Congress wanted to cover the whole set, and it did.  
The distinction, to the extent there is one, between a “claim” 
and a “demand” is therefore unimportant to the scope of the 
channeling injunction; the relevant question is instead 
whether an action seeks recovery that stems from the debtor’s 
asbestos-related liabilities.  If it does, then it falls somewhere 
within the broad category of “any claim or demand,” and can 
be subject to a channeling injunction. 
 
 Montana and the Crown dispute the breadth of that 
interpretation, arguing that, for due process reasons, their 
requests cannot be channeled to a trust.  They cite our recent 
decision in Wright v. Owens Corning, see supra note 18, 
which concluded that due process prevents some claims from 
being discharged by reorganization plans that were proposed 
and confirmed during the Frenville era.  679 F.3d at 107-09.  
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Because the law during those bankruptcies was that claims 
arise when they accrue, some potential claimants might have 
received notice of a bankruptcy but failed to file a claim 
because they understood that their claims had not yet 
“arisen.”  Id. at 108.  Therefore, although claims against a 
debtor are generally discharged by plan confirmation, such 
claimants lacked adequate notice for their claims to have been 
discharged without violating due process.   
 
 But Owens Corning is inapposite, because the 
bankruptcy plan at issue in that case did not involve a 
§ 524(g) trust and channeling injunction.  Although 
Montana’s and the Crown’s claims against Grace will be 
discharged, § 524(g) sends those claims, along with all other 
asbestos-related claims and demands, to a trust.  Montana and 
the Crown will therefore have an opportunity to litigate their 
claims and potentially obtain relief, which means that the due 
process concern in Owens Corning – that claimants would 
lose any opportunity for relief without first receiving proper 
notice – is not implicated.  Rather, the potential due process 
issue associated with channeling claims to a trust is the 
fairness of forcing future claimants, many of whom might 
have had no notice at all of the bankruptcy, to bring their 
claims against a trust rather than against the debtor directly.  
That concern is addressed by the proper application of 
§ 524(g).  As we explained in Combustion Engineering, and 
again in Grossman’s, § 524(g) includes a number of 
requirements that “are specifically tailored to protect the due 
process rights of future claimants,” such as the “fair and 
equitable” provision and the mandatory seventy-five percent 
approval requirement.  Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 234 
n.45 (citing, inter alia, 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii), 
(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb)); see also Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 127 
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(“By enacting § 524(g), Congress took account of the due 
process implications of discharging future claims of 
individuals whose injuries were not manifest at the time of 
the bankruptcy petition.”).  Therefore, as long as a court 
correctly determines that § 524(g)’s requirements are 
satisfied, present and future claims can be channeled to a 
§ 524(g) trust without violating due process.
20
         
 
 Montana’s and the Crown’s next argument is that their 
claims for indemnification and contribution are substantively 
different from Grace’s other asbestos-related liabilities, and 
thus cannot be channeled to the trust for that reason.  They 
base that contention on § 524(g)(2)(B)(i), which explains that 
the purpose of a trust “is to assume the liabilities of a debtor 
                                              
 
20
  Montana and the Crown also contend that, under 
Owens Corning, they cannot be considered to have “claims.”  
They base that contention on Owens Corning’s discussion of 
the lingering effect of our overruled Frenville decision.  See 
Owens Corning, 679 F.3d at 109 (explaining that Frenville 
must continue to define when certain claims can be 
discharged, for the due process reasons discussed above).  But 
that discussion does not help their case, because in Owens 
Corning we did not hold that Frenville continues to define 
when a claim arises – we held only that “[t]he shadow of 
Frenville” prevents some claims from being discharged.  Id.  
Indeed, the opinion explicitly separates those two issues, 
concluding that an individual did hold a claim during the 
bankruptcy, but that the claim could not be discharged 
without violating due process.  Id. at 107.  Montana’s and the 
Crown’s contention that they do not even hold claims is 
therefore flatly contradicted by both Grossman’s and Owens 
Corning.       
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which … has been named as a defendant in personal injury, 
wrongful death, or property-damage actions seeking recovery 
for damages allegedly caused by the presence of, or exposure 
to, asbestos or asbestos-containing products.”  11 U.S.C. 
§ 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I).  Montana and the Crown assert that, 
because of that language, only asbestos-related personal 
injury, wrongful death, and property damage actions can be 
subject to the channeling injunction. 
 
 The argument fails, however, since § 524(g) expressly 
states that a court can “enjoin entities from taking legal action 
for the purpose of directly or indirectly collecting” on a claim 
or demand that is to be paid by a trust.  Id. § 524(g)(1)(B) 
(emphasis added).  Although they are each being sued under a 
failure-to-warn theory of liability, Montana and the Crown 
concede that they only have claims against Grace because the 
plaintiffs bringing the failure-to-warn lawsuits were allegedly 
harmed by Grace’s asbestos-related products and operations.  
In other words, behind each failure-to-warn suit against 
Montana and the Crown is a plaintiff with a personal injury, 
wrongful death, or property damage claim against Grace.  
More precisely, there must be such a plaintiff in order for 
Montana and the Crown to have a basis for their claims at all.  
Montana’s and the Crown’s actions against Grace therefore 
are brought “for the purpose of … indirectly … receiving 
payment or recovery” for asbestos-related personal injury and 
property damage claims against the debtor, and thus are 
subject to the § 524(g) channeling injunction under the plain 
language of that statute.  See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(B), 
(2)(B).                             
 
 That interpretation is consistent with the purpose of 
§ 524(g).  As noted above, the statute was modeled on the 
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trust established in the Johns-Manville bankruptcy, which 
subjected all asbestos-related claims, including 
“indemnification or contribution liabilities or obligations” of 
the debtor, to a channeling injunction.  (Plan Proponents App. 
at 602040 (the Manville Corporation Second Amended 
Restated Plan of Reorganization, at 2).)  Inclusion of such 
liabilities in the injunction is also a matter of practicality, 
because one of the primary goals of § 524(g) is to allow a 
debtor to “emerge[] from bankruptcy free and clear” of 
asbestos liability, and thus enable the debtor to “grow[] the 
pie available to victims” (provided, of course, that asbestos 
claimants’ interests are adequately protected).  140 Cong. 
Rec. S4521-01 (daily ed.) (Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. 
Brown).  If the reorganized debtor could still be exposed to 
indirect asbestos claims for indemnification and contribution, 
lingering uncertainty regarding the scope of that liability 
would threaten the debtor’s recovery and hinder Congress’s 
objective of providing “an ‘evergreen’ source of funding to 
pay future claims.”  Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 234. 
 
 Finally, the narrow interpretation of § 524(g) advanced 
by Montana and the Crown is unsupported by any caselaw 
and would effectively rewrite the provision.  Montana and the 
Crown offer no explanation for § 524(g)’s explicit inclusion 
of actions that “indirectly” seek recovery on asbestos-related 
claims.  Instead, they simply ignore that language and assert 
that § 524(g) addresses only direct personal injury, wrongful 
death, and property damage actions.  But we are not free to 
ignore an express provision of the statute, as it is our “judicial 
duty to give faithful meaning to the language Congress 
adopted.”  United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 309 
(1976).  It is a mystery what Congress could have meant by 
an action that “indirectly” seeks recovery if it did not mean to 
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include an action seeking indemnification or contribution.  
Little wonder, then, that courts have consistently upheld the 
channeling of such claims to § 524(g) trusts.  See, e.g., In re 
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 348 B.R. 136, 168-69 (D. Del. 
2006) (“Because Indirect PI Trust Claims … relate to direct 
Asbestos Personal Injury Claims, they are appropriately 
channeled to the Asbestos PI Trust and have historically been 
channeled to trusts established in connection with asbestos 
related chapter 11 cases.”); In re Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 
453 B.R. 570, 582 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2011) (concluding that 
“an entity that may pay a future demand holder and thereby 
acquire an indirect claim” against the debtor has “interests 
that are no different from any other Indirect Claimant’s 
interests,” and the entity’s claims can thus be channeled to a 
§ 524(g) trust); In re Celotex Corp., 204 B.R. 586, 622 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (enjoining any claim or demand 
“asserting or accomplishing any setoff, right of subrogation, 
indemnity, contribution or recoupment of any kind” against 
the debtor).   
 
 We therefore conclude that the Bankruptcy Court and 
the District Court correctly held that Montana’s and the 
Crown’s claims for indemnification and contribution are 
subject to the channeling injunction included in the Joint 
Plan.  Section 524(g) gives courts the express authority to 
“enjoin entities from taking legal action for the purpose of 
directly or indirectly … recovering … with respect to any 
claim or demand that … is to be paid … by a [§ 524(g)] 
trust,” 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(B), which is precisely the type 
of action that Montana and the Crown each wish to take 
against reorganized Grace.  The channeling injunction thus 
properly encompasses their claims, and their arguments to the 
contrary were rightly rejected. 
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  2. Section 1122 
 
 Having decided that § 524(g) permits a channeling 
injunction to extend to the claims asserted by Montana and 
the Crown, we can readily dispense with the argument that 
those claims were improperly placed in Class 6, which 
includes all asbestos personal injury claims.
21
  Under § 1122 
of the Bankruptcy Code, “a plan may place a claim or an 
interest in a particular class only if such claim or interest is 
substantially similar to the other claims or interests of such 
class.”  11 U.S.C. § 1122(a).  To determine whether claims 
are “substantially similar,” the proper focus is on “the legal 
character of the claim as it relates to the assets of the debtor.”  
In re AOV Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(emphasis omitted); see also In re Tribune Co., 476 B.R. 843, 
855 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (concluding that the phrase 
“substantially similar” reflects “the legal attributes of the 
claims, not who holds them” (internal quotation marks 
omitted); In re Quigley Co., 377 B.R. 110, 116 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Claims are similar if they have 
substantially similar rights to the debtor’s assets.” (emphasis 
and internal quotation marks omitted)).  The Bankruptcy 
Court has “broad discretion” to decide if a plan satisfies that 
requirement, and we will uphold a plan’s classification 
scheme so long as it is “reasonable” and does not “arbitrarily 
designate classes.”  In the Matter of Jersey City Med. Ctr., 
817 F.2d 1055, 1061 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks 
                                              
 
21
  Although some of the Crown’s claims are classified 
in Class 8 (Canadian ZAI Claims), see supra Section I.B, it 
only challenges the classification of its indirect personal 
injury claims in Class 6 (Asbestos Personal Injury Claims).    
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omitted); see also John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Route 
37 Bus. Park Assocs., 987 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(interpreting § 1122(a) to bar the debtor from “arbitrarily” 
designating classes or doing so in a manner that “would not 
serve any legitimate purpose”).   
 
 Here, Montana and the Crown identify only one 
difference in “legal effect against the debtor’s assets” 
between their claims and the other claims in Class 6: their 
claims “are not subject (or should not be subject) to an 
injunction imposed pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 
524(g).”  (Montana Opening Br. at 43.)  That argument fails, 
because, for all of the reasons already discussed, their claims 
certainly are subject to the channeling injunction.  Moreover, 
as the District Court observed, “[b]oth direct and indirect 
claims under the Plan exhibit a similar effect on Grace’s 
bankruptcy estate – they seek recovery from the trust for 
actions related to Grace’s asbestos liability.”  In re W.R. 
Grace & Co., 475 B.R. at 110.  Although Montana and the 
Crown must first be held liable for failure to warn before they 
can bring a claim against the trust, that makes no difference to 
Grace, as its liability for such a claim depends solely on its 
asbestos-related activities.  The Joint Plan therefore 
reasonably classified claims for indemnification and 
contribution together with direct personal injury claims.  
 
 B. Disparate Treatment of Creditors 
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 We turn next to the contention that the Joint Plan 
should not have been confirmed because the TDPs
22
 may 
result in disparate treatment among claims within the same 
class.  As Montana and the Crown correctly note, “equality of 
distribution among creditors is a central policy of the 
Bankruptcy Code” that is furthered by several different Code 
provisions.  In re Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 239 
(quoting Bergier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Relevant here, § 1123(a)(4) 
requires that a plan “provide the same treatment for each 
claim or interest of a particular class,” 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1123(a)(4),
23
 and § 524(g) mandates that “present claims 
and future demands that involve similar claims” be paid “in 
substantially the same manner,”  id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V).  
Together, the two provisions ensure that claims in a class that 
will be channeled to a § 524(g) trust receive the same 
treatment, regardless of when they are brought.  In 
determining whether a plan provides for the same treatment 
of claimants in a class, “we consider the bankruptcy scheme 
as an integrated whole.”  In re Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 
241. 
 
 Although “neither the Code nor the legislative history 
precisely defines the standards of equal treatment,” In re AOV 
                                              
 
22
   The TDPs, as earlier noted, see supra Section I.B, 
are the trust distribution procedures for the personal injury 
trust established in the Joint Plan. 
 
23
  Section 1123 permits disparate treatment when “the 
holder of a particular claim or interest agrees to … less 
favorable treatment,” but neither Montana nor the Crown has 
done so here.  11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4).   
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Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d at 1152, courts have interpreted the 
“same treatment” requirement to mean that all claimants in a 
class must have “the same opportunity” for recovery.  In re 
Dana Corp., 412 B.R. 53, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see also In re 
Cent. Med. Ctr., Inc., 122 B.R. 568, 575 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 
1990) (concluding that a plan that “subjects all members of 
the same class to the same process for claim payment” is 
“sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Section 
1123(a)(4)”).  For example, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that “[a]sbestos 
health claimants would receive the ‘same treatment’ if they 
all were permitted to present their claims to a jury and were 
all paid whatever amounts the jury awarded, until funds were 
no longer available.”  In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 
982 F.2d 721, 749 (2d Cir. 1992), opinion modified on 
rehearing, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).  What matters, then, is 
not that claimants recover the same amount but that they have 
equal opportunity to recover on their claims.  See id. 
(“Without question, the ‘same treatment’ standard of section 
1123(a)(4) does not require that all claimants within a class 
receive the same amount of money.”)   
 
 Courts are also in agreement that § 1123(a)(4) “does 
not require precise equality, only approximate equality.”  In 
re Quigley Co., Inc., 377 B.R. 110, 116 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2007); see also In re Multiut Corp., 449 B.R. 323, 334 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011) (same).  Certain procedural 
differences, such as a “delay in receipt of distributions” for 
some claims, “do[] not alone constitute unequal treatment.”  
In re New Power Co., 438 F.3d 1113, 1122-23 (11th Cir. 
2006); see also In re Multiut, 449 B.R. at 337 (same).  In fact, 
§ 524(g) “clearly envisions that asbestos claims will be paid 
periodically as they accrue and as they are allowed,” since it 
 36 
 
requires courts to ensure that there will be sufficient funds 
available for both future demands and present claims to 
receive similar treatment.  In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. 
832, 842-43 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2003).  Therefore, differences 
in the timing of distributions and other procedural variations 
that have a legitimate basis do not generally violate 
§ 1123(a)(4) unless they produce a substantive difference in a 
claimant’s opportunity to recover.  See In re New Power Co., 
438 F.3d at 1122-23 (concluding that a plan provision did not 
violate § 1123(a)(4) in part because it was “procedural rather 
than substantive”); cf. In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d 
648, 660 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a difference in the 
procedural protections offered to certain claimants violated 
§ 1123(a)(4) because some claimants were “accorded far 
more effective recovery rights” than others).     
 
 Under that standard, none of the provisions of the 
TDPs that Montana and the Crown complain of amounts to 
disparate treatment of creditors.  Montana and the Crown first 
take issue with a provision that allows indirect claims to be 
considered “presumptively valid” only if, among other things, 
“the Indirect Claimant has paid all or a portion of a liability or 
obligation that the PI Trust had to the Direct Claimant.”  
(Montana Opening Br. at 47 (quoting J.A. at 200326) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).)  They say that such a 
requirement may provide no payout for indirect claims, and is 
therefore discriminatory.  But the only indirect claims that 
will not be paid based on that provision are those for which 
Grace has no underlying liability.   As the District Court 
rightly said, there is no “legal authority that requires a debtor 
to reimburse third parties for wrongs for which the debtor is 
not responsible,” and thus a bar on such recovery cannot be 
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said to constitute disparate treatment.  In re W.R. Grace & 
Co., 475 B.R. at 136.   
 
 Montana and the Crown next complain that the “first-
in, first-out” mechanism for processing and paying claims 
discriminates against indirect claims.  Citing testimony from 
the future claimants’ representative that “there is a 
possibility” that the trust may have insufficient funds to pay 
future claims, they argue that, because claims for 
indemnification and contribution depend on another judgment 
first being obtained, their claims will likely be brought later 
than direct asbestos claims and thus will be less likely to 
obtain recovery.  (Montana Opening Br. at 51 (quoting J.A. at 
201664A) (internal quotation marks omitted).)  They say that 
the only fair method for resolving claims against the trust is 
“for no distributions to be made until all” indemnification and 
contribution claims have arisen and been asserted.  (Id. at 52.)   
 
 There are significant problems with that argument.  
First, although there may be a “possibility” that the trust will 
have insufficient funds to compensate future claimants, the 
Joint Plan endeavors to make that scenario as unlikely as 
possible.  To that end, it funds the personal injury trust with 
the amount agreed to by the PI Committee and the future 
claimants’ representative, it limits recoveries using the 
“Payment Percentage” (which is specifically designed to 
ensure that present and future claimants receive equivalent 
amounts), and it allows the Payment Percentage to be 
modified as needed to permit future recoveries.
24
  Second, the 
                                              
 
24
  As discussed earlier, see supra Section I.B, the 
“Payment Percentage” limits each claimant’s recovery to a 
certain percentage of the liquidated value of his or her claim, 
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“first-in, first-out” payment process is a common feature of 
§ 524(g) trusts, see In re Federal-Mogul, 684 F.3d at 360 
n.12, and it treats all claims identically, resolving both direct 
and indirect claims in the order that they are received.  
Although it may be true that indirect claims will generally 
recover later under that process because they require the 
additional step of a judgment being entered against the 
claimant, the “delayed receipt of distributions to members of 
a class whose claims remain disputed does not, in and of 
itself, violate § 1123(a)(4).”  In re New Power Co., 438 F.3d 
at 1122.  Finally, it would be wholly unreasonable to require 
asbestos victims – many of whom have already waited 
through twelve years of bankruptcy – to continue to wait 
indefinitely until all indirect claims accrue before they can 
recover from the trust.  Cf. In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. at 
842 (“It is not necessary to make liquidated claims wait for 
payment until all disputed and unliquidated claims have been 
resolved.”).  Rather, by requiring courts to ensure that future 
demands will be treated fairly, § 524(g) specifically 
acknowledges that some claims against a trust may recover 
earlier than others.  See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V) 
(requiring that the court ensure that the trust will “operate 
through mechanisms … that provide reasonable assurance 
that the trust will value, and be in a financial position to pay, 
present claims and future demands that involve similar claims 
in substantially the same manner”).  We therefore agree with 
the District Court that the “first-in, first-out” mechanism does 
not violate § 1123(a)(4) or § 524(g). 
 
                                                                                                     
in order to ensure that funds will be available for future 
claims.    
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 Montana and the Crown also assert that the TDPs are 
discriminatory because they impose additional restrictions on 
indirect claims.  Specifically, the complaints are that indirect 
claimants cannot recover attorneys’ fees; that, in order to 
have a presumptively valid claim, an indirect claimant must 
secure a release of liability against the trust from the direct 
claimant; and that personal injury claims are limited by the 
“maximum value” provision of the TDPs.  The District Court 
properly rejected the argument that any of those features 
make the TDPs unfair.  Montana and the Crown have not 
demonstrated a right to attorneys’ fees under their local tort 
regimes, and there is therefore no reason why they should 
expect to recover attorneys’ fees from the trust.  There is also 
nothing discriminatory about requiring an indirect claimant to 
obtain a release from the direct claimant whose claims 
provide the basis for seeking indemnification or contribution.  
That requirement has the legitimate objective of ensuring that 
an indirect claimant has satisfied a liability of the debtors, and 
it would not make sense to extend it to direct claims.  In any 
event, the release provision does not limit a claimant’s 
opportunity for recovery, as indirect claimants who are unable 
to obtain a release can still pursue their claims through the 
individual review process.
25
  As for the “maximum value” 
                                              
 
25
  The release of liability is only required for indirect 
claimants seeking expedited review of their claims.  The 
TDPs expressly state that, “[i]f an Indirect Claimant cannot 
meet the presumptive requirements” necessary for expedited 
review, “including the requirement that the Indirect Claimant 
provide the [personal injury] [t]rust with a full release of the 
Direct Claimant’s claim, the Indirect Claimant may request 
that the [personal injury] [t]rust review the … [c]laim 
individually.”  (J.A. at 200326.)   
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provision, that requirement applies with equal force to direct 
and indirect claims, and therefore does not result in disparate 
treatment of claims.   
 
 Finally, the Crown independently argues that the TDPs 
are discriminatory both because Canadian property damage 
claimants will allegedly receive inferior recovery to U.S. 
property damage claimants, and because the Crown cannot 
qualify for “extraordinary claim” treatment.  The first of those 
contentions seems to be based on the amount allocated to the 
Canadian ZAI property damage claims fund, which is 
significantly less than the amount being allocated for U.S. 
property damage claims.  But, as the District Court correctly 
noted, Canadian and U.S. property damage claimants are 
classified in separate classes, operate under separate tort 
regimes, and reached separate settlement agreements.  See In 
re W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. at 138-39.  There is therefore 
no reason to expect that they would receive the same dollar 
amount in recovery, and, more importantly, § 1123(a)(4) does 
not demand that they receive equal treatment, as it requires 
only that a plan “provide the same treatment for each claim or 
interest of a particular class.”  11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) 
(emphasis added).  Moreover, it is unclear whether the 
Crown’s assertion that Canadian claimants will receive less 
than their U.S. counterparts is even factually accurate, as the 
Crown provides no information on the estimated number of 
Canadian property damage claims, so there is no way to 
conclude that the available funds are unduly limited. 
 
 As for the “extraordinary claim” provision, it is 
designed to provide a remedy for certain individuals harmed 
by Grace who have “little likelihood of a substantial recovery 
elsewhere.”  (J.A. at 200323.)  The Crown is therefore correct 
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that the provision treats certain claims differently than others, 
but it does so based on the claimant’s particular factual 
situation, in much the same way that the expedited review 
process treats claims differently based on the particular 
disease at issue.  The Crown does not contest that such 
substantive distinctions among claims are valid bases for 
potential differences in the amount of recovery, nor does it 
argue that the individualized review process will value its 
claims at less than they would be worth under the tort system.  
Therefore, it has not shown that the “extraordinary claim” 
provision unfairly limits its opportunity for recovery.          
 
 In sum, the District Court rightly determined that the 
Joint Plan satisfies the equal treatment provisions of 
§ 1123(a)(4) and § 524(g).  Although there may, at the 
margins, be some differences in recovery for direct and 
indirect claims, those differences do not amount to disparate 
treatment of creditors.   
 
 C. “Fair and Equitable” to Future Claimants 
 
 Montana’s and the Crown’s final contention is that the 
Joint Plan violates the “fair and equitable” provision of 
§ 524(g).  That provision requires that, before confirming a 
plan involving a § 524(g) trust, a court must determine that 
the proposed channeling injunction is “fair and equitable with 
respect to the persons that might subsequently assert … 
demands” against the trust “in light of the benefits provided 
… to such trust on behalf of [the] debtor.”  11 U.S.C. 
§ 524(g)(4)(B)(ii).
26
  In other words, the provision requires a 
                                              
 
26
  Although it uses similar language, the § 524(g) “fair 
and equitable” provision is separate from the “fair and 
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reviewing court to consider whether, given the funds 
available in a trust, it is “fair and equitable” to channel future 
demands to that trust.   
 
 Although no court of appeals has yet interpreted what 
“fair and equitable” means in that context, other courts seem 
to agree that one way to evaluate the equities is to consider 
the amount being contributed to the trust in comparison to the 
liability exposure of the protected parties.  See, e.g., In re 
Plant Insulation Co., 485 B.R. 203, 227 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(“[T]he analysis appropriately focuses on the relationship 
between the contributions of protected entities to the Trust, 
and the benefits received by the same under the terms of the 
channeling injunction.”); In re Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. 
167, 180 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007) (“A review of the case law 
suggests that finding that an injunction is fair and equitable is 
closely tied to the value being contributed to the plan.”).  
Given the substantial benefit provided by the channeling 
injunction, courts have held that the protected parties’ 
contribution to the trust must be sufficient to justify that 
extraordinary form of relief.  See In re Quigley Co., 437 B.R. 
at 133;  In re Plant Insulation Co., 485 B.R. at 227 
(considering whether the protected parties provided the trust 
                                                                                                     
equitable” provision of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b), which provides 
that the court can confirm a plan over the objection of an 
impaired and dissenting class of creditors if it is “fair and 
equitable … with respect to each class of claims or interests 
that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.”  11 
U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1).  Because Montana and the Crown are in 
classes that overwhelmingly accepted Grace’s Joint Plan, they 
do not challenge plan confirmation under § 1129(b), and it is 
not at issue in this appeal.      
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“with sufficient benefits to justify the injunctive relief 
provided to them, from the perspective of future asbestos 
injury claimants”).  Under that standard, channeling 
injunctions have generally been considered “fair and 
equitable” to future claimants when the trust contribution that 
will be available to those claimants bears some relationship to 
the estimated value to the debtor of enjoining their claims.  In 
re Quigley Co., 437 B.R. at 140 (denying plan confirmation 
because future demand holders would receive only about 
$147 million, whereas the value to the debtor of enjoining 
their claims was $613 million); see also In re G-I Holdings 
Inc., 420 B.R. 216, 276 (D.N.J. 2009) (concluding that the 
“substantial contributions provided” to the trust made it fair to 
future claimants). 
 
 Montana and the Crown do not suggest that the 
amount being contributed to the personal injury and property 
damage trusts is out of sensible proportion to the liability 
exposure of the protected parties.
27
  Rather, they contend that 
                                              
 
27
   Because Montana and the Crown do not take issue 
with the size of the trust contribution, we need not determine 
in this case when an imbalance between the liability exposure 
and the amount being contributed to a trust prevents an 
injunction from being “fair and equitable” under § 524(g).  
We note, however, that the trust contribution does not have to 
be equal to the projected liability in order for the injunction to 
be fair to future claimants.  Although the statutory language at 
issue focuses on the funds available to pay future claims, 
§ 524(g) does not require that those claims be paid in full.  
Rather, it requires that future claims be paid “in substantially 
the same manner” as present claims.  11 U.S.C. 
§ 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V).  In many cases, the trust may be funded 
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the TDPs are “unfair and inequitable” because they “lack 
certainty regarding the amount of distributions and the 
procedure for distributions” (Montana Opening Br. at 56), 
and because the Trust Advisory Committee includes 
“attorneys for underlying asbestos claimholders,” which they 
say is unfair to indirect claimants (id. at 57).  We are 
unconvinced that those allegations are even relevant to the 
question of whether the channeling injunction is fair and 
equitable under § 524(g).  As Grace points out, 
§ 524(g)(4)(B)(ii) “is not a catch-all provision” for objecting 
to plan provisions (Grace Br. at 78); rather, it specifically 
addresses whether it is fair to enjoin future claims against the 
debtor in light of the amount being contributed to the trust.  
But even if Montana’s and the Crown’s allegations of 
                                                                                                     
in an amount that, as here, only allows present and future 
claimants to recover a portion of the value of their claims.  
See Federal-Mogul, 684 F.3d at 360 n.12 (“[F]ew trusts pay 
the full value of submitted claims; current payment 
percentages range widely, but the median is 25%, with most 
trusts paying between ten and forty-six percent of a claim’s 
liquidated value.”).  But that alone does not mean that the 
injunction is unfair or inequitable, since, without such a 
limitation, the debtor may be forced to liquidate and be 
unable to pay future claims at all.  For that reason, courts look 
for a relationship between the protected parties’ contribution 
to the trust and the benefit they are receiving from the 
injunction, and do not require the trust contribution to be 
equal to the estimated value of future claims.  We leave for 
another day the question of how to determine whether the 
benefit of an injunction outweighs the value committed to the 
trust to a degree that channeling future claims would be unfair 
to future claimants.                  
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unfairness were relevant to the statutory inquiry, they are 
baseless.  Although they complain that the TDPs do not 
precisely determine the amount of future recoveries, that 
uncertainty is unavoidable, as it is impossible to calculate 
precisely how many future demands will be brought or how 
much those claimants will be entitled to recover.  One cannot 
even have a § 524(g) trust unless “the actual amounts, 
numbers, and timing of such future demands cannot be 
determined.”  11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(II).  As for their 
complaint regarding the Trust Advisory Committee members, 
that committee exercises only limited control over trust 
distributions, and Montana and the Crown have pointed to no 
evidence suggesting that the committee has or will engage in 
improper conduct.  There therefore was no error in the 
District Court’s determination that the channeling injunction 
is fair and equitable to future claimants under § 524(g).       
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the 
District Court correctly affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s 
order overruling the objections of Montana and the Crown to 
Grace’s Joint Plan, and we will affirm the Court’s order to 
that effect.   
 
